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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Easements-Creation by Covenant in Deed
Plaintiff sought to have a municipal garbage dump abated as a
private and public nuisance and to recover special damages for its
maintenance.1 The municipality defended the action on the basis of a
recorded deed in which the predecessors in title to the plaintiff granted
the defendant the right to use the land as a garbage dump and released
all rights of action arising out of the use of the land for that purpose.
This release was expressly made binding upon the grantors' successors
in title. The North Carolina Supreme Court held on appeal that even if
it be conceded that the normal operation of the garbage dump consti-
tuted a nuisance, the plaintiff was estopped to assert any claim by rea-
son of the covenants in the deed to defendant. The release created a
"right in the nature of an easement" in the remaining lands of the
grantor, binding on his successors in interest.2
While easements3 are generally created by grant or prescription, a
covenant may be given the effect of granting an easement when neces-
sary to carry out the manifest intention of the parties.4 Such covenants
are valid and enforceable without regard to whether they may interfere
with alienation. 5 A covenant will be construed as creating an easement
only under certain conditions. There must be both a dominant and a
servient tenement. 6 The easement created must be appurtenant to the
dominant tenement to which it belongs and must relate to the servient
tenement upon which its burden is imposed. 7 The dominant tenement
must be described with particularity s and must receive substantial bene-
fit from the easement created.9 It is not necessary that the dominant and
'Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N. C. 26, 62 S. E. 2d 512 (1950).2 Although the court speaks of this as being a right in the nature of an ease-
ment, it is giving the covenant the effect of a duly recorded easement.
' The word "easement," as here used includes both negative and affirmative
easements. "A negative easement is one the effect of which is not to authorize
the doing of an act by the person entitled to the easement, but merely to preclude
the owner of the land subject to the easement from doing that which, if no ease-
ment existed, he would be entitled to do. An affirmative easement is one which
authorizes the doing of acts which, if no easement existed, would give rise to
a right of action." Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289,
66 P. 2d 792 (1937).
'Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N. E. 794 (1930) ; Hogan v. Berry,
143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253 (1887); Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175 (1871);
Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1 (1870); 1 THo PsoN, REAL PROPERTY §372(Perm. ed. 1939) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §776 (3d ed. 1939).
'2 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY §259 (1947).
' Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 16R N. E. 794 (1930). "A dominant
estate is the one enjoying the easement, and to which it is attached; the servient
estate is the one upon which the easement is imposed." Walker v. Clifford, 128
Ala. 67, 29 So. 588 (1901).
'Murphey v. Kerr, 5 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925).8 Martin v. Ray, 76 Cal. App. 2d 465, 173 P. 2d 573 (1946).
Murphey v. Kerr, 5 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925).
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servient tenements be contiguous,' 0 and whether an easement is appurte-
nant or in gross1 ' is determined by the intent of the parties. 12 Since
such a covenant concerns an interest in realty, and hence comes within
the Statute of Frauds, the courts have generally required that it be in
writing, and a mere oral license is revocable.13
A great variety of covenants have been held to create valid and en-
forceable easements. When the grantor covenanted for himself and his
heirs, assigns and personal representatives that he would forever main-
tain a fence between the property conveyed and his remaining lands,
the court held that this covenant imposed an easement in the adjacent
land of the grantor in favor of the grantee which could only be conveyed
with a grant of the dominant tenement to which it was attached.14
Such a covenant runs with the land, and is not merely personal between
the parties. Covenants for light and air between adjoining property
owners and between parties to a deed may create easements' 5 which
pass to subsequent grantees of the property to which the easement
appertains.' 6 A covenant in restraint of trade does not create an ease-
ment since it is invalid as being against public policy.' 7 A covenant
that the land would revert to the grantor if the premises should ever
be used for the sale of liquors has been held to create an easement
appurtenant to the remaining lands of the grantor,' 8 and agreements
between persons who each own a separate half of a building that no
20 D. M. Goodwillie Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 42, 89 N. E.
272 (1909).
" "Easements appendant and appurtenant are always owned in connection with
other real estate and as incidents to such ownership, while easements in gross are
purely personal and usually end with the death of the grantee." Davis v. Robin-
son, 189 N. C. 589, 598, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
A right of way across another's property to gain egress and ingress to the
realty owned would be an appurtenant easement. An easement in gross, however,
is purely personal, and is owned independently of any other ownership of realty.
For example, a grant to A of the right to fish on the land of X, confers an ease-
ment in gross on A. 1 MoRDEcAi's LAw LECtUrES 469 (2d ed. 1916). This is
connected with the requirement that there be a servient and a dominant tenement,
for if the covenantee has no estate to which the covenant may appertain or attach,
it is purely personal, and usually ends with the death of the covenantee.
"Post v. Bailey, 110 W. Va. 504, 159 S. E. 524 (1931).
Village of Dwight v. Hayes, 150 Ill. 273, 37 N. E. 218 (1894).
,Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 (1881); Kellogg v. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276
(1834) (covenant by grantee).
"Bryan v. Grossee, 155 Cal. 132, 99 Pac. 499 (1909); Davis v. McCarthy,
131 App. Div. 755, 116 '. Y. Supp. 149 (1910), aff'd suithout opinion, 198 N. Y.
581, 92 N. E. 1083 (1910).
"6 North Carolina, however, has said, ... the easement of light and air, some-
times called the 'Ancient Window Doctrine,' does not apply in this State." Davis
v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 599, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
17 Kettle River R. R. v. Eastern R. R., 41 Minn. 461, 43 N. W. 469 (1889);
1 THompsox, op. cit. supra note 4, §375.
'




change will be made in the front of the building19 constitute reciprocal
easements. Agreements between parties to a deed that they will dedicate
a strip for a road;20 that the grantor will have water pumped into a
reservoir on the land of the grantee ;21 that space will be kept open "for
the passage of teams ;,22 that the grantor will erect no building within a
certain distance of the property conveyed ;23 or that the grantee will
"build and maintain a suitable wagon road crossing at the grade,"24 have
been held to create easements because the covenant concerned land or its
use, and the creation of an easement was necessary in order to give effect
to the manifest intention of the parties. When adjoining property owners
mutually covenanted that none of the properties would be used or occu-
pied by persons of Negro descent, 25 or that each would observe a certain
building line,2 6 an easement was created in favor of each property owner
in all property covered by the agreement, which inured to the benefit of
his successors in interest. Restrictions placed upon lots conveyed by a
common grantor as part of a general scheme for the benefit of the land,
requiring grantees to set back the front walls of structures 27 or restric-
tions on the use of the property,2 8 have all been held to give each
grantee, as appurtenant to his land, an easement in every other lot
covered by the deeds, binding on and enforceable by and against each
owner's successor in interest.
A release of a claim for damages 29 caused by a particular under-
taking or occurrence on the land of the released party is given the effect
of a covenant creating an easement in favor of and appurtenant to the
property of the released party. In an action for damages arising out
of the flooding of the plaintiff's land, the defendant showed a release
executed by the plaintiff's predecessor in title in favor of defendant.3 0
" First Nat'l Bank of Portsmouth v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 71 N. H. 547,
53 Atl. 1017 (1902).2 0 United New Jersey R. R. & Canal Co. v. Crucible Steel Co., 86 N. J. Eq.
258, 98 At. 1087 (1916), affirining decree 85 N. J. Eq. 7, 95 Atl. 243 (Ch. 1915).
"1 Murphey v. Kerr, 5 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925).2 Morton v. Thompson, 69 Vt. 432, 38 Atl. 88 (1897).
2" Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253 (1887) ; Hennen v. Deveny,
71 W. Va. 629, 77 S. E. 142 (1913).
" Beck v. County of Lane, 141 Ore. 580, 18 P. 2d 594 (1933).
" Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938) ; Porter v. Johnson,
232 Mo. App. 1150, 115 S. W. 2d 529 (1938).
26 Wetmore v. Bruce, 118 N. Y. 319, 23 N. E. 303 (1890).
27 Brandenburg v. Lager, 272 Ill. 622, 112 N. E. 321 (1916) ; Gilbert v. Reper-
tory Co., 302 Mass. 105, 18 N. E. 2d 965 (1939).
2 Scheuer v. Britt, 217 Ala. 196, 115 So. 237 (1928) (lots sold for residential
purposes only) ; State ex rel. Britton v. Mulloy, 332 Mo. 1107, 61 S. W. 2d 741(1933) (property to be used only for residential purposes) ; Schwab v. Whitmore
Rauber & Vicinus Co., 245 App. Div. 174, 281 N. Y. Supp. 30 (1935); Kokenge v.
Whetstone, 60 Ohio App. 302, 20 N. E. 2d 965 (1935).
2" The release of both presently existing and future claims were here con-
templated.
"
0Brush v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 322, 138 Atl. 860 (1927).
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The court held that this was not merely a revocable license, but was the
grant of an easement or estate in lands binding on the grantees of the
predecessor in title. In an action to restrain the defendant from pollut-
ing a stream with mine tailings, the defendant produced a release from
the grantor of the plaintiff, and the court held that the release was bind-
ing on the plaintiff as it created an easement in the watercourse.8 1
Owners of land in executing a release of a railroad from all claims
incident to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the road,
thereby created an easement appurtenant to the property of the railroad,
binding on their heirs and assigns.3 2 Similarly, where plaintiff's pred-
ecessor in title executed a release for himself and all those claiming
under him of all causes of action arising out of the erection of a build-
ing in the street in front of his property, the court found that the
release created an easement. It held that if the owner could grant to
another the right to make a certain use of his land, he necessarily could
bind his successors in title if he executed his will so as to charge his
successor with notice of such incumbrance.3 3 When a covenant not to
enforce a present or future right concerns land or its use, there seems
to be little argument against its being construed as constituting an ease-
ment in the land concerned.34
Some suggestion has been made that covenants creating easements
must be consistent with public policy,35 but such a limitation has not
often presented itself as an obstacle. In cases of releases executed in
favor of some objectionable enterprise, such as a sewage disposal plant3"
or a coal mine trash dump which emits noxious vapors and smoke,3 7
the courts have held that the land owner was not estopped to sue in a
situation where the released party was acting negligently or maliciously.
Indeed, the decision in the principal case38 appears to be limited to a
situation where' the garbage dump is being operated in a reasonably
careful and prudent manner.3 9 In a North Carolina case, the court
"Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702 (1942).
'
2 Pennsylvania R. R. v. Kearns, 71 Ohio App. 209, 48 N. E. 2d 1012 (1943).
"Walterman v. Village of Norwalk, 145 Wis. 663, 130 N. W. 479 (1911).
"There is no doubt in modern times that an attempted release of a future
right must be construed as amounting at least to a covenant not to enforce the
right whenever it arises." 6 WnLLisToN, CONTRACrS §1823 (Rev. ed. 1938).
'Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702 (1942) (release of right to sue
for pollution of watercourse held binding on releasors provided the deterioration
in quality of the watercourse was not so great as to constitute a public nuisance) ;
Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1, 17 (1870) (construction of a covenant creating
an easement limited to a situation where the covenant was consistent with public
policy).
"J. T. Donohue Realty Co. v. Wagner, 154 Md. 588, 141 At. 337 (1928).
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mann, 298 Ky. 28, 181 S. W. 2d 394 (1944).
'
8 Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N. C. 26, 62 S. E. 2d 512 (1950).
""We do not construe plaintiff's complaint to allege that the nuisance com-
plained of was the result of negligent conduct. . . ." Waldrop v. Town of Brevard,
233 N. C. 26, 62 S. E. 2d 512 (1950).
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
refused to accept the construction of a release by a lessee which would
have exempted the lessor from liability for the creation of such unsani-
tary conditions as would seriously impair the health of the lessee.40
As regards releases of any claims which may arise in the future from
acts of the released party which would otherwise give rise to an action in
tort, such agreements do not seem to be opposed to public policy 41
if the only effect is upon the property of the releasor. 42 A railroad may
even be released from liability for its negligence in damaging property
placed upon a portion of its right of way which had been leased to -the
owner of the damaged property. 43
North Carolina law concerning the creation of easements is rela-
tively scarce, although it seems to be in accord with the majority of
eases in other jurisdictions. In a previous case involving a release very
similar to the one in the principal case, the court held that a covenant
creating an easement is an interest in realty within the meaning of the
Statute of Frauds, and is required to be in writing.44 N. C. GEN. STAT.
§47-27 (1950) requires all easements to be recorded in order to be
binding upon bona fide purchasers for value.4 5 This serves as construc-
tive notice of the existence of the easement. 46 The North Carolina court
has held along with the majority that the intent to create the easement
must be clear ;47 that the creation of an easement must be needed in order
to give effect to the intention of the parties ;48 and that the easement must
be appurtenant to the dominant tenement in order to inure to the benefit
o Godfrey v. Power Co., 190 N. C. 24, 128 S. E. 485 (1925).
"Brush v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 322, 138 Atl. 860 (1927).426 WmwsTo, CONRAcrs §1751B (Rev. ed. 1938).
" Southern Ry. v. Stearns Brothers, Inc., 28 F. 2d 560 (4th Cir. 1928).
"Clark v. A. C. L. R. R., 192 N. C. 280, 135 S. E. 26 (1926). The court
and the parties in the principal case seemed to treat the question as a case of first
impression in North Carolina, for the opinion and the briefs cite no North Caro-
lina authority for the proposition that a release may constitute a covenant not to
sue and create an easement.
" Walker v. Phelps, 202 N. C. 344, 162 S. E. 727 (1932) (covenant creating
easement held binding on all persons claiming under covenantor subsequent to
registration of the deed containing covenant).
40 The -principal case presents an interesting problem in this regard. There
the covenant which is construed as creating an easement was not contained in any
deed in the plaintiff's direct chain of title, yet such easement was binding upon him
because the deed in which it was contained was recorded. This would seem to
cast a greater burden of care on the part of those searching titles not only to
examine carefully every deed in the chain of title, but also to carefully examine,
analyze and construe all other deeds executed by each grantor in the chain. In
the situation of a grantor making a large number of grants out of a single tract,
any one of which might contain such a covenant binding all other realty in the
same tract, the problem and task involved would approach unreasonable magnitude.
'1 Ring v. Mayberry, 168 N. C. 563, 84 S. E. 846 (1915) ; Norfleet v. Cromwell,
64 N. C. 1, 17 (1870).
"8 "The words are strictly of covenant, and a construction converting them into
a grant can only be justified if supported by some direct authority, or very clearly
'by the reason of the thing.'" Blount v. Harvey, 51 N. C. 186, 188 (1858).
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of the successors in interest of the covenantee, and not merely in gross.40
The few cases decided in North Carolina seem to contemplate the
existence of both a dominant and a servient tenement, and at least one
case has held that the covenant so creating the easement must conform
to public policy.50 The North Carolina court has expressed no opinion
as to whether the covenant would be objectionable if it interfered with
alienation, and has had no occasion to decide whether the dominant
tenement must be described with particularity; whether the dominant
tenement must receive substantial benefit from the easement created;
nor whether the dominant and servient tenements must be contiguous.
There is, however, no indication that the North Carolina court would
find itself in disagreement with these requirements, which have been
dealt with in other jurisdictions, if the question were properly presented.
Regarded in the light of the foregoing discussion, the decision in the
principal case does not seem to be out of line with the holdings of the
majority and the court seems to have adhered to the principles announced
in earlier cases in North Carolina.
WILLIAM C. MORRIS, JR.
Labor Law-Arbitration in North Carolina
Arbitration, as a means of settling commercial and property disputes
without resort to the judicial system, was authorized by statute in colo-
nial North Carolina' and was commonly used, as shown by the number
of cases which reached the Supreme Court, in the early days of state-
hood.2 However, it was not until two hundred years after the first
"Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 598, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
o Covenant was held to create an easement running with the lands, and bind-
ing upon a subsequent purchaser in fee. The court added: "This decision is limited
to a case in principle like this: Where the intent to create an easement is clear,
where the easement is apparent, and where the covenant is consistent with public
policy, and so qualifies or regulates the mode of enjoying the easement, that if it be
disregarded, the easement created will be substantially different from that in-
tended." (Italics added.) Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1, 17 (1870).
' Laws of 1749, North Carolina, "An Act for determining Differences by Arbi-
tration," adopting the English statute, 9 & 10 William III c. 15 (1698). 23 CLARK,
STATE REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA 325 (1904). This statute is no longer in
force. Simpson v. McBee, 14 N. C. 531 (1832).
2 Compare the number of arbitration cases in recent volumes with the fact that
eight cases between 1795 and 1801 are reported in the first three volumes of the
North Carolina reports. Early subject matters included disputes over land bound-
aries, a horse, and partnership accounts. It is difficult, however, to differentiate
early cases of court rules of reference by consent and voluntary ex curia arbi-
tration.
The rudimentary condition of the courts may have accounted for much early
resort to arbitration. Not until 1806 was there a superior court for each county.
Until 1818 there was _no separate supreme court. Adams, Evolutlo,; of Law in
North Carolina, 2 N. C. L. REv. 133, 138 (1924). In 1846, Governor Graham still
longed for a time when "all Law suits could 'be ended in one, or at most two
years from their commencement, instead of being, as they often are, transmitted
from father to son." JonNsoN, ANTE BE.LUm NORTH CAROLINA 638 (1937).
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